Ethiopia’s Su-35 and S-400 Purchases: Will CAATSA Sanctions Follow Despite Massive U.S., EU and World Bank Aid?
Will Ethiopia face sanctions from the United States or the European Union for buying Russian Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 air-defense systems while remaining a major recipient of aid from the USA, the EU and the World Bank?
Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the United States can impose sanctions on countries—including partners and aid recipients—that engage in significant transactions with Russia’s defense sector.
The law is discretionary, not automatic, but it has been applied before.
Previously, both Egypt and Turkey were blocked from buying advanced Russian fighter jets and air-defense systems. Turkey was removed from the F-35 program and sanctioned after purchasing the S-400.
Egypt was pressured by the United States to cancel its Su-35 order. Ethiopia’s current Su-35 aircraft were originally produced for that cancelled Egyptian deal; after Cairo withdrew under U.S. pressure, the jets became available for Ethiopia.
Ethiopia continues to receive substantial financial support. In the current year it has received hundreds of millions of dollars from the United States and the European Union (including budget support and bilateral programs). Since Abiy Ahmed became Prime Minister in 2018, total U.S. aid alone has reached roughly $10–11 billion, with additional large packages from the EU and the World Bank.
There has already been public backlash. Irish MP and businessman Stewart Fitzell criticized the situation, stating that it is unacceptable for Irish and European taxpayers’ money to continue flowing to Ethiopia while the country buys advanced Russian weapons systems. Other Irish business and political voices have raised similar concerns about the apparent contradiction between aid and arms purchases.
Whether the United States will impose sanctions on Ethiopia after the midterm elections remains uncertain. CAATSA gives the administration flexibility, and geopolitical considerations in the Horn of Africa will likely influence the decision. Whether Egypt will lobby for sanctions is also unclear at this stage—that remains to be seen.
In short, Ethiopia’s Russian arms deals place it in a legally and politically exposed position under CAATSA, even while it continues to receive large-scale Western and multilateral aid. The final outcome will depend on U.S. political calculations after the midterms and on any diplomatic pressure from regional actors such as Egypt.